Israel’s announcement that it had recovered the remains of the last Israeli prisoner from the Gaza Strip was not a separate event from the cease-fire agreement, but rather a direct political test of the possibility of moving from the first phase to the second.
The move comes at a very sensitive time, with Benjamin Netanyahu’s government’s calculations intersecting with the limits of US pressure and Israel’s continued attempts to redefine the agreement from a binding path to a framework that can be deferred and reinterpreted.
Install Prime Minister Netanyahu’s website
From the first moment, Prime Minister Netanyahu treated the event not as a right to negotiate, but as a political tool. The recovery of the bodies was presented as a “security achievement” in an attempt to remove it from the context of the agreement and include it within the narrative of the achievement of the war’s objectives. The speech was not directed abroad, but was a message aimed at strengthening Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position within his right-wing coalition and confirming that the government was acting according to its own calculations, rather than moving between stages of the deal in response to American pressure.
However, the data confirms that the body file is not the actual barrier to transitioning to the second stage. That’s because basic information about its location has been available for weeks. This means that the slow recovery is linked to political calculations, specifically the trans-Rafah file. Therefore, this file was used as a temporary deactivation card before using broader and more complex pretexts.
negotiation and open negotiation
This is evidenced by the later announcement of the opening of the Rafah crossing, which was described as a “limited” opening and carried out under a “fully Israeli oversight mechanism.” Instead of clearly implementing the terms of the first phase of the cease-fire agreement, the content of the rights was emptied and the opening of the river crossing became a conditional measure to reproduce another form of Israeli control.
In essence, Netanyahu’s government views the agreement as an open negotiation forum rather than a binding interim path. According to this vision, the second phase does not begin automatically with the end of the first phase, but is subject to political and security reassessment. From this point of view, the movement to introduce a new file to the agenda quickly progressed. First and foremost is to disarm Hamas and link its reconstruction to a long-term security agreement, turning the second stage into a negotiating forum rather than an administrative capacity.
The US position appears to be torn between pressure and containment. The US government has put clear pressure on Israel to recover the bodies and open the Rafah crossing, but at the same time, given the US government’s recognition that the current Israeli government is not prepared to make such a major political decision, it has accepted a formula that does not follow the letter of the agreement and achieve practical goals that reflect US policy based on preventing the agreement from collapsing.
Second stage scenario
Given this situation, there are three possible scenarios for the progression of the second stage. The first scenario: a formal transition in which Israel announces an initial commitment to the second phase, without moving it into a clear implementation phase, with key items on hold due to security or procedural pretexts. This scenario allows the agreement to remain formal while effectively suspending it.
Second scenario: conditional transfer. This is the most likely so far and is based on a conditional transfer without content. In this context, Israel agrees to start the second phase, but ties its implementation to a series of new conditions not included in the agreed text, including disarmament, long-term security agreements, and linking reconstruction to expanded political and security oversight. Therefore, the second stage will be an open negotiation process with no time limits.
The third scenario involves repurposing the first phase under a different name through an extension of the fragile ceasefire, limited opening of borders, and technical processing of some files, without making any official announcement regarding the transition to the second phase. This scenario would allow Israel to avoid declaring the agreement a failure, and at the same time prevent it from reaching comprehensive political rights.
Maintaining the coalition is unclear
Within Israel, the policy does not appear to impose any immediate political costs on Netanyahu. His right-wing supporters do not consider moving to a second stage a priority, but rather consider managing ambiguity as a means of maintaining coalition balance. Prime Minister Netanyahu therefore continues to manage the agreement using the logic of crisis management rather than solutions.
In conclusion, the interment of the bodies of the last Israeli prisoners of war cannot be considered a valid entry point to the second phase of the agreement to stop the war in Gaza, since it only eliminates one pretext, without affecting the essence of Israel’s policy, which is based on postponement and renegotiation. The actual transition depends on an Israeli decision that is yet to come and international pressure that does not exceed the containment ceiling, making the second stage a deferred title rather than an open road.
Israel’s announcement that it had recovered the body of the last Israeli soldier from the Gaza Strip was not a separate event from the ceasefire agreement, but rather a direct political test of the possibility of moving from the first phase to the second phase.
The timing of this move was highly sensitive, intersecting with the calculations of President Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, the limits of American pressure, and Israel’s continued attempts to redefine the agreement from a binding path to a framework that can be postponed and reinterpreted.
Strengthen Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position
From the first moment, Prime Minister Netanyahu treated the event not as a right to negotiate but as a political tool. The recovery of the bodies was presented as a “security achievement” in an attempt to remove it from the context of the agreement and include it within the narrative of achieving the war objectives. The statement was not an outward message, but a message aimed at strengthening Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position within the right-wing coalition, confirming that the government would act according to its own calculations, rather than moving back and forth between agreements in response to American pressure.
However, the data supports that physical problems are not an actual barrier to transitioning to the second stage. Important information regarding its location has been available for several weeks. This meant that the slow recovery was linked to political calculations, especially regarding the Rafah crossing. As a result, the issue was used as a temporary delaying tactic before moving on to a broader and more complex justification.
negotiation and public negotiation
This is evident in how the opening of the Rafah crossing was later announced and how that phase was described as a “limited” opening with “full Israeli supervision”. Instead of explicitly implementing the terms of the first phase set out in the ceasefire agreement, the rights lost their substance and the opening of the crossing turned into a conditional procedure that reproduced another form of Israeli control.
Fundamentally, Netanyahu’s government views the deal as an open forum for negotiation rather than a binding step-by-step path. According to this vision, the second phase does not automatically begin with the end of the first phase, but is subject to political and security reassessment. In this light, there was a rapid push to introduce new files to the agenda. The most important of these was to link the disarmament and rehabilitation of Hamas to a long-term security agreement, turning the second phase into a negotiating forum rather than an executive capacity.
The US position appears to be torn between pressure and containment. The US government has put clear pressure on Israel to recover the bodies and open the Rafah crossing, but at the same time, given the US government’s recognition that the current Israeli government is not prepared to make such a major political decision, it has accepted a formula that is neither consistent with the text of the agreement nor achieves its practical goals, reflecting US policy aimed at preventing the agreement from collapsing.
Second phase scenario
Given this scene, three potential scenarios emerge for the second stage. First scenario: In a formal transition, Israel announces an initial commitment to the second phase without moving into explicit executive action, with key provisions suspended due to security and procedural justifications. In this scenario, the contract can be formally upheld while effectively making it void.
Second scenario: Conditional transitions are by far the most likely and are based on conditional content-free transitions. Under this framework, Israel agrees to start the second phase, but ties its implementation to a series of new conditions not included in the agreement, such as disarmament and long-term security agreements, and links reconstruction to expanded political and security oversight. Therefore, the second phase becomes an open-ended negotiation process with no time limit.
A third scenario is to reuse the first phase under a different name by extending the fragile ceasefire, restricting the opening of borders, and taking technical action on some files without formally announcing the transition to the second phase. This scenario would allow Israel to avoid declaring the agreement a failure while preventing it from achieving comprehensive political rights.
Ambiguity in maintaining a coalition government
Within Israel, the policy does not appear to impose any immediate political costs on Prime Minister Netanyahu. His right-wing supporters do not see moving to a second stage as a priority, but rather see managing ambiguity as a way to maintain coalition balance. Prime Minister Netanyahu thus continues to manage the agreement with the logic of crisis management, rather than resolving it.
In conclusion, the recovery of the body of the last Israeli soldier cannot be considered a genuine entry point to the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza. It simply eliminates one justification without touching on the essence of Israel’s policy, which is based on postponement and renegotiation. The actual transition will depend on Israeli decisions, which are not available at the moment, and international pressure that does not exceed the limits of containment, making the second stage a deferred title rather than an open road.
